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CIVIL RICO AND THE PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION
REQUIREMENT: HAS THE SECOND CIRCUIT DRAWN THE
NET TOO TIGHTLY?-Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985)
(No. 84-648).
In 1970 Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO)' to halt organized crime's infiltration of the American
economy. Congress created "enhanced sanctions and new remedies" 2
against defendants who engage in racketeering activity to operate or gain
control of business enterprises. One new remedy was "civil RICO," which
authorizes anyone "injured in his business or property" to recover treble
damages and attorneys' fees if this injury results from a violation of the act.3
In recent years the number of private civil RICO cases has escalated
dramatically,4 prompting federal courts to seek reasoned limits on civil
RICO to prevent its misapplication. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,5 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals added its effort to limit the civil RICO
"net." 6 The court ruled that private civil RICO suits may only be brought
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922,941 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982)).
2. Id., 84 Stat. at 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). The statute also authorizes the government to seek criminal
penalties and civil remedies. Criminal sanctions include fines up to $25,000, imprisonment for up to 20
years, and forfeiture of interests wrongfully acquired or maintained. Id. § 1963. TheAttorney General's
civil remedies include divestiture of the violator's business interests, dissolution of the enterprise, and
injunctions against future participation in similar businesses. Id. § 1964(a), (b), (d).
4. The increase in number of suits under civil RICO has been called a "virtual deluge," Skinner &
Tone, Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 22, and an "explosion,"
Miller & Olson, The Expanding Uses of Civil RICO, CAL. LAw., June 1984, at 12. Because of the
increasing popularity of the provision, one article called it "everybody's darling." Strafer, Massumi &
Skolnick, CivilRICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody'sDarling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655 (1982).
See infra note 23 for statistics on the number of cases.
For a recent bibliography on RICO, see Selected Materials on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 39 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 436 (1984).
5. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14,1985) (No. 84-648).
Sedima was one of a trio of civil RICO decisions issued on successive days. In the second decision,
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W.
3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-657), a different Second Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of a
bankruptcy fraud case after concluding that the plaintiff had not proven any distinct injury due to a
pattern of racketeering. In the third RICO decision, Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F2d 524, 525 (2d Cir. 1984),
petition for cert.filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1984) (No. 84-604), a third panel concluded
that neither RICO's language nor its legislative history imposed a racketeering injury requirement on
plaintiffs, but, based on the Sedima and Bankers Trust opinions, felt compelled to affirm the district
court's dismissal of a RICO claim. The Furman panel indicated'that an attempt to have the Second
Circuit hear all three en banc failed. Id. Judge Cardamone filed dissenting opinions in both Sedima and
Bankers Trust and was a majority member of the Furman panel.
6. Numerous authorities characterize RICO as a "net." See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos.,
Washington Law Review
after the defendant has been criminally convicted for the acts alleged in the
suit. 7 The court also held that RICO plaintiffs must demonstrate a "rack-
eteering injury" in addition to the injury caused by the alleged acts. 8
This Note analyzes the Second Circuit's decision9 in Sedima against the
background of the explosion of civil RICO suits and judicial attempts to
contain that explosion. It concludes that courts should reject the prior
criminal conviction requirement. The requirement is unsupported by either
the language or the legislative history of the act, and in practice the
requirement would frustrate legislative purposes and deny recovery to those
victims whom Congress intended the act should compensate. Moreover, the
requirement nullifies the purpose of the private attorney general concept.
Until Congress acts to redefine the statute, other limitations would create
more desirable results than those produced by requiring a prior criminal
conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Structure of RICO
RICO was part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which
Congress passed in its quest for new and more effective measures to combat
organized crime's ability to escape traditional sanctions. 10 One of these
measures was a provision for a private right of action arising out of a RICO
violation. " I The private cause of action was added as a House amendment to
the original Senate bill and received little debate on the floor of either the
727 F.2d 648,654(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,903(5th Cir.), cert. denied. 439
U.S. 953 (1978).
7. 741 F.2d at 496.
8. Id. at 494.
9. No other circuit has adopted the prior criminal conviction requirement, and few courts or
commentators have addressed whether the statute requires prior criminal convictions. In contrast,
numerous courts and commentators have addressed the racketeering injury requirement. See infra notes
47-54 and accompanying text.
10. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (Statement of
Findings and Purpose).
Congress rejected as unworkable and possibly unconstitutional a statute based on affiliation with
organized crime. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970) (rejecting an amendment proposed by Represen-
tative Biaggi that would have specifically criminalized membership in the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra).
Instead, Congress concentrated on the types of offenses that it considered to be characteristic of
organized crime. For example, Senator McClellan, one of the sponsors of the bill, commented that "the
Senate Report does not claim . . . that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members of
organized crime, only that those offenses are characteristic of organized crime." McClellan, The
Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 55,
142 (1970).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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Senate or the House. 12 Statements in support of the act, however, indicate
that the private remedy was patterned after the antitrust provisions in section
4 of the Clayton Act. 13
The civil provisions of RICO, section 1964(c), provide:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Section 1962 proscribes three separate activities. First, RICO makes it
unlawful to use or invest any income derived from a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" in the acquisition, establishment, or operation of any enter-
prise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 14 Second,
RICO prohibits acquiring or maintaining an interest in such an enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering activity" 15 or conducting or participating
in such an enterprise's activities through a "pattern of racketeering
activity. "16 Third, the statute makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of
these provisions.17
Section 1961 provides statutory definitions for the key terms of section
1962. "Racketeering activity" is defined to include a number of state and
federal offenses, known as "predicate offenses."1 8 A "pattern of racketeer-
12. The Second Circuit observed that the civil provision was proposed in the middle of the second
and last day of House discussion of the bill and that only three remarks were made regarding this
amendment. Sedima, 741 E2d at490. The Senate accepted the House amendment without a conference.
Id. at 489. In addition to the extensive review of legislative history inSedima, id. at 488-92, refer also to
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 237, 249-80 (1982). See generally Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30, and Related
Proposals Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
13. Representative Steiger and the American Bar Association (ABA) both proposed amending title
IX to add a civil RICO provision. Representative Steiger suggested the amendment to "make applicable
those provisions granting anti-trust type remedies to deal with organized crime, the parallel private anti-
trust type remedies available now to private persons under the anti-trust law." House Hearings, supra
note 12, at 520 (proposal of Rep. Steiger). The ABA statement recommended "the additional civil
remedy of authorizing private damage suits based upon the concept of Section 4 of the Clayton Act." Id.
at 543-44 (statement of Edward L. Wright, ABA president-elect). The ABA had previously gone on
record as endorsing the use of antitrust and other "appropriate civil weaponry into the anti-crime
arsenal, particularly against organized crime." Id. at 544. Congressman Poff later commented that
RICO's private cause of action was "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use
against organized criminality." 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
15. Id. § 1962(b).
16. Id. § 1962(c).
17. Id. § 1962(d).
18. Id. § 1961(1). State offenses are included in subsection (A) by generic designation; these
involve acts or threats chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
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ing activity" is defined as the commission of at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity within a ten-year period. 19 An "enterprise" is broadly defined
as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or oth er legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity. ,20 Finally, Congress provided that the act shall be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 21
B. The Civil RICO "Explosion"
There were few civil cases in the first decade after Congress enacted the
statute, but in recent years the private damages provision has gone from
relative obscurity to virtual notoriety.22 There are several reasons for this
"explosion" 23 of cases. On its face the RICO statute is very broad-not
only does it encompass a wide variety of predicate offenses, but those such
as mail and wire fraud are themselves broad. 24 In addition, the provision for
year. Federal offenses included under subsections (B) and (C) are those listed as indictable by specific
reference to the United States Code, including mail fraud, wire fraud, and certain labor acts, plus, by
general reference under subsection (D), "any offense involving.., fraud in the sale of securities" or
certain drug-related activities, punishable under any law of the United States.
19. Id. § 1961(5).
20. Id. § 1961(4).
21. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,947.
22. Most of the civil RICO case law is contained in federal district court opinions, the majority of
which reflect pre-judgment decisions on motions such as change of venue, class certification, or motions
for dismissal. In 1984 it was reported that only one RICO suit had gone to judgment. Comment, Civil
RICO: Pleading Fraud for Treble Damages, 45 MoNT. L. REV. 87, 89 n.14 (1984) (referring to B.F.
Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1983)).
23. Estimates vary on the number of civil RICO suits. One newspaper article reported that there are
now over 100 published opinions. Siegel, 'RICO' Running Amok in Board Rooms, L.A. Times, Feb. 15,
1984, § I, at 1, col. 4. Another author reported that more than 250 RICO civil lawsuits have been filed in
the last few years. Nathan, Civil RICO (Part 1), 29 PRAc. LAW. 11, 12 (1983).
The author of this Note reviewed 192 published decisions. The following illustrates the pattern of
increase:
1970-79 8 reported cases
1980 5
1981 16
1982 33
1983 63
1984 67
192
Latest reported decision reviewed was Dec. 14, 1984. If there was more than one decision on a case, only
the highest level or most recent was counted. Of these, 29 were appellate and 163 were district court
decisions. The Second Circuit, with 56 district court and 7 appellate court opinions, had the most
reported decisions. Research of author Dec. 1984 (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
See also infra notes 29, 31 & 40.
24. See supra note 18. Cases construing mail fraud apply to wire fraud. E.g., United States v.
Tamopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977). To constitute an indictable offense under these statutes,
there must be a scheme designed to defraud or to obtain money or property by false pretenses, and the
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treble damages plus attorneys' fees provides an incentive to sue. Other
factors include the liberal construction provision, 25 ease of proof,26 and
broad discovery encompassing at least the statutory ten-year period for
patterns of activity.27 RICO also contains liberal venue and process provi-
sions. 28 Attorneys today often include a RICO claim with other claims or
assert it as a counterclaim. 29 Some even suggest that not asserting a RICO
claim may constitute negligence. 30
Because many of the predicate offenses such as mail and wire fraud,
securities fraud, or bribery may easily encompass business transactions,
RICO has frequently been used against many kinds of "garden variety"
use of the mails or interstate wires, including interstate telephone calls, in furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). "Scheme to defraud" has not been limited to common law
notions of fraud or false pretenses, but has been broadly applied in such areas as commercial bribery,
intangible rights, and breaches of fiduciary relationships. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d
1347, 1353 (4th Cir.) (scheme to defraud the public of its right to the governor's "loyal and honest"
services), affid in relevant part on reh'g en banc, 602 E2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
Commentators have expressed concern with federal courts' willingness to consistently expand the
borders of the mail and wire fraud statutes. See, e.g., Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The
ContinuingStory of the "Evolution" ofA White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 1 (1983); Hurson,
Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 423 (1983).
Courts have criticized the use of mail and wire fraud as underlying predicate acts in civil RICO cases,
because it was clearly established when RICO was enacted that there is no private right of action for
violations of these statutes. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F Supp. 1347, 1361
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 719 F2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. First, the burden of proof in a civil suit has generally been held to be preponderance of the
evidence, rather than the reasonable doubt standard used in criminal suits. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
Second, it may be easier to prove a RICO claim than other types of claims. RICO's attractiveness in
antitrust cases, for example, results from the fact that a RICO claim may survive in some cases in which
an antitrust claim cannot. Miller & Olson, supra note 4, at 12. An antitrust claim would be difficult to
assert if a business were injured by predatory practices of a principal competitor, and the predator was
acting unilaterally and did not have the realistic prospect of gaining a monopoly. But if the scheme had
been carried out through the mails, the plaintiff might well assert a RICO claim using the mail fraud
statute. Miller & Olson note that "the plaintiff might be better off under RICO because no proof would
be necessary on market share, relevant market, or other complex antitrust issues." Id. at 12-13.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
28. For example, venue may be had in any district where the defendant "resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs." Id. § 1965(a). Nationwide venue and service of process is provided if
required by the "ends ofjustice." Id. § 1965(b). Subpoenas can be served outside the district of venue
and beyond the 100 mile limit upon a showing of good cause. Id. § 1965(c).
29. A RICO claim is seldom brought by itself. Of the 192 cases reviewed, see supra note 23, 80%
also had state and/or federal claims in the same or related action, or requested the addition of a RICO
claim to an existing state or federal action; 68% had related state claims, including two with state RICO
claims; and 55% had other federal claims, over three-fourths of which were alleged violations of federal
securities or antitrust laws, in the same suit In 20% of the 192 cases, there was either no other action or
it was not possible to determine this from the published decision. Defendants asserted RICO coun-
terclaims in four cases.
30. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 23, at 21 (quoting a private attorney, "It's almost malpractice if I
don't use [civil RICO].").
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fraud. 31 The roster of civil RICO defendants includes such diverse entities
as county governments, 32 unions, 33 stockbrokers, 34 retirement homes, 35
law firms, 36 insurance companies, 37 public utilities, 38 and banks. 39 For
many of these defendants, the racketeering label is especially damaging.
C. Judicial Limitations on Civil RICO
The judiciary is becoming increasingly hostile toward the growing use of
civil RICO. A number of courts have expressed concern that the statute,
rather than being used to attack organized crime, 40 is being used to
federalize traditionally state matters.41 Judges denounce the inherent lack
of prosecutorial restraint in private civil actions, 42 and criticize the collat-
31. Of the 192 cases reviewed by this author, see supra note 23, it was possible to determine the
underlying predicate acts in 127 cases. Of these, 87% or IIl cases alleged one or more forms of fraud:
95 of these alleged mail or wire fraud, 41 alleged securities fraud, and 3 alleged bankruptcy fraud. For
discussion of civil RICO's application to business fraud, see Note, Civil RICO and "Garden Variety"
Fraud-A Suggested Analysis, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93 (1983); Comment, Liability for General
Business Fraud: Putting A Contract Out On RICO Treble Damages, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 481 (1984).
32. Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Del. 1984).
34. In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
35. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (1982), affd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
36. DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. Co., 571 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ohio 1983), appeal dismissed
without opinion, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984).
37. Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
38. County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. I11. 1983).
39. Fields v. National Republic Bank, 546 F Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
40. Indeed, in this author's review, see supra note 23, less than 6% of the cases indicated any link to
organized crime (i.e., in the traditional sense, such as including known crime figures, violence, or other
organized crime characteristics).
41. One district court characterized the "kernel of the debate" as whether the claims should be
limited in order to "prevent the federalization of a large body of state law fraud." Yancoski v. E.F
Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The Yancoski court rejected the federalization
argument, finding the concern unwarranted since § 1964(c) itself provides adequate standing require-
ments. Id. at 96. Other courts cite United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), in which the Supreme
Court construed the criminal provisions of RICO and found that the statute and its legislative history
indicated Congress's awareness that it was entering a "new domain of federal involvement" and that
Congress was also well aware of the fear that RICO would "'mov[e] large substantive areas formerly
totally within the police power of the State into the Federal realm.'"' Id. at 586-87 (citations omitted).
Congress nonetheless enacted the measure over these objections, knowing it would alter the federal/
state relationship.
42. E.g., Sedima, 741 E2d at 497. The Justice Department, by contrast, has issued guidelines for
bringing a criminal RICO action. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 110 (March 9, 1984). The guidelines
consist of six directives concerning the type of prosecutions that should and should not be brought under
the statute. Id. ch. 9.110.300ff. The guidelines require that no RICO prosecution be commenced
without the prior approval of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department's
Criminal Division. Id. ch. 9.110.320. But cf Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 297-98
(1983) (Justice Department guidelines may not halt abuses in bringing criminal RICO cases, since these
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eral advantage achieved by the pejorative connotation of racketeering.43
Because of these concerns, courts have begun to restrict the right to
maintain RICO civil actions. The following is a sketch of the major lines of
analysis.
The first limitation employed by courts focused on a required link to
organized -crime.44 If a defendant could not be characterized fairly as a.
member of an organized crime group, these courts reasoned that the statute
was not meant to apply to them. In dismissing suits that failed to allege a
nexus with organized crime, judges relied on legislative history to rule that
the claims may be within the letter of the statute, but fall outside the spirit of
the law.45 The overwhelming majority of courts, however, have rejected the
organized crime limitation.46
The second major limitation, the "racketeering injury" requirement,47
are merely advisory; the author questions whether Department approval effectively restrains zealous
prosecutors).
43. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F Supp. 667, 682 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (citing the in
terrorem effect of the statute); Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of
Securities," 18 GA. L. REv. 43, 46-47 (1983) (RICO is a tool for intimidation where "a plaintiff can
smear a defendant with Mafia associations"); Tarlow, supra note 42, at 293, 416-17 ("prejudicial
impact" results from racketeering label). The stigma of the racketeering label prompted the ABA to
recommend replacing the term "racketeering activity" with the less pejorative phrase "criminal
activity." SECTION OF CRimINAL JusIcE, AMERwCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPoRr].
44. The first civil RICO suit to impose an organized crime requirement was Barr v. WUI/TAS, 66
ER.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
45. E.g., id. at 113.
46. See In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1426-28 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (collecting criminal and civil
cases requiring an organized crime connection, and those cases rejecting such a nexus; concludes
overwhelming majority has rejected the requirement). See also Comment, Putting a Halt to Judicial
Limitations on Civil RICO, 52 U. Mo. KAN. Crry. L. REv. 56, 60 (1983) (majority view rejects a
requirement to allege or prove organized crime connections). Despite the weight of authority, some
recent court decisions have required a link to organized crime. See, e.g., Aliberti v. E. F. Hutton & Co.,
591 F. Supp. 632 (D.C. Mass. 1984); Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fe. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 91,573 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
47. This requirement has been labeled alternatively as a "racketeering enterprise injury," or simply
"RICO-type injury." For cases requiring a racketeering injury, see, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
719 F2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F Supp.
1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 R Supp. 1002,1006 (C.D. Cal.
1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981). The court in
Bruns indicated as examples: "A 'racketeering enterprise injury' might be found if a civil RICO
defendant's capacity to harm the plaintiff is enhanced by an infusion of cash from illicit activities...
or if the plaintiff lost a cable TV franchise because of bribes paid by the defendant to the city council."
583 . Supp. at 1056 (citations omitted). Further examples of racketeering injuries are provided in
Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1984),petitionforcert.filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367
(U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-657). See infra note 138.
Generally, courts requiring this special injury have not found the injury to exist in cases before them.
A few courts have rejected the racketeering injury requirement but found that the case before them
probably satisfied the requirement anyway. See, e.g., Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
589 R Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (D. Mass. 1984); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F2d
408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984).
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focuses on whether the complaint alleges the appropriate kind of injury.
Courts instituting this requirement hold that the injury alleged must be
"something other" than that arising out of the commission of the predicate
offenses. This reasoning is based on RICO's similarities to the Clayton Act.
Congress, in requiring that a civil RICO plaintiff prove injury "by reason of
section 1962," used language nearly identical to that found in section 4 of
the Clayton Act.48 Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clayton
Act's "by reason of" language to require that a plaintiff prove antitrust
injury,49 courts have held that RICO's remedies should similarly be
restricted to a special kind of injury.
Early civil RICO cases directly transplanted the antitrust "competitive
injury" concept and required that RICO plaintiffs also must allege a
competitive injury.50 Later cases, however, repudiate such a strict inter-
pretation.5 1 Rather, these courts rely indirectly on analogies to the antitrust
laws to create a "racketeering injury" requirement, holding that the injury
must be "of the sort that RICO was enacted to remedy and deter. "52 Courts
reason that RICO's legislative history supports the requirement for "some-
thing more," since Congress did not indicate it intended to create a new set
of remedies for actions that had previously been the province of state or
federal laws. 53 The racketeering injury requirement has been one of the
most hotly disputed RICO issues in the federal courts; there does not appear
to be a clear weight of authority either for or against this requirement. 54
48. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982)).
49. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) ("[P]laintiffs must
prove. . . injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful.").
50. E.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 R Supp. 207, 210-1 (N.D. I11. 1980)
(RICO's purpose is to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business and interference with free competi-
tion).
51. The Seventh Circuit discredited North Barrington's competitive injury requirement in Schacht
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[S]uch a crabbed interpretation ... does not fully
credit Congressional intent or fulfill the purposes of RICO."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1984). See
In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1431 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (citing cases which require and those which
reject a competitive injury requirement, and concluding that the majority of courts have rejected the
requirement).
52. Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
53. See Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("Congress... did not intend
to provide an additional remedy for an already compensable injury.").
54. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 388 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984)
(citing cases which require and those which reject a racketeering injury), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W.
3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-822).
Commentators also disagree on whether a racketeering injury is required. Compare, e.g., Note,
RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1531 (1983) (the
requirement suffers "[o]n the one hand [from being] illusory, and on the other, it is both under-inclusive
and over-inclusive") with Bridges, supra note 43, at 68-71 (relation between RICO and antitrust laws
supports requirement of a distinct § 1962 injury rather than just the predicate acts in § 1961).
Civil RICO and the Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement
Rather than adopt a general limitation, a third group of courts has relied
on scrutiny of RICO claims, dismissing claims that did not adequately
allege a particular element of the RICO cause of action spelled out in the
statute. Judges have focused, for example, on "pattern of racketeering
injury," 55 "enterprise," 56 and "injury in one's business or property." 57
Lack of proximate cause has also been used to dismiss cases where the
plaintiffs were only indirect victims of the alleged RICO violations. 58
Finally, some courts have also examined the underlying predicate offenses
to ensure that these independently could withstand dismissal, especially in
cases of alleged securities fraud.59
55. Discussion has often focused on whether the "pattern of racketeering activity," as used in the
Act, requires that the two or more acts be interrelated. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,
899 n.23 (5th Cir.) (rejecting that the acts must be interrelated, but noting that some district courts have
held otherwise), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
56. For example, one court held that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a RICO claim because
there was neither a sufficient nexus between the defendants and the enterprise nor between the enterprise
and interstate commerce. Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp.
1408, 1411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Other courts have held that a complaint failed to state a cause of action
under RICO because it did not distinguish the "enterprise," as the vehicle for the pattern of racketeering
activity, from the culpable "person" whose conduct RICO proscribes. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 581 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Cf B.F Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright
Refining Co., 577 F Supp. 339, 347 (D.N.J. 1983) (no requirement of separate identity between the
"enterprise" and the "person"). See also Comment, supra note 46, at 66-70 (discussing how the
enterprise element has been used to limit civil RICO cases).
57. See, e.g., Morrison v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 743,744 (D.D.C. 1984) (RICO
limits injury to one's business or property, not personal injury arising out of a products liability case);
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982) (plaintiff claimed
losses from purchasing literature and services from the defendant church; court indicated "[w]e do not
believe Congress intended § 1964(c) to afford a remedy to every consumer who could trace purchase of
a product to a violation of § 1962").
58. See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 E2d 449,457 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the
court upheld dismissal of a RICO count brought by a company's independent auditors against the
company and its former officers and directors. When stock purchasers sued the company for inflating its
stock prices, the purchasers also alleged that the auditors were negligent in auditing the company's
financial statements. As a result, the auditors had to settle claims with the purchasers. The auditors then
alleged that RICO injuries were incurred "as a consequence of being used as a tool of the criminal
enterprise." Id. The court held that the auditors lacked standing to maintain a civil RICO action, finding
that the auditors only suffered indirectly from the violation. Id. In essence, the decision requires direct,
proximately caused injury from the RICO violation.
59. Thus, where the allegations of fraud under the Securities Exchange Act were sufficient to state a
claim, courts have held that the allegations were also sufficient to state a RICO claim. Conversely,
where there was no valid securities fraud cause of action, the claim could not serve as a predicate offense
under RICO. Compare In re Catanella, 583 F Supp. 1358, 1425 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (claim sufficient under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was adequate to support RICO claim) with Moss v. Morgan Stanley
Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1983) (since shareholder failed to state a valid claim of securities fraud,
the RICO claim likewise failed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
Courts have been especlly concerned over the apparent inconsistency of allowing treble damages
for what are essentially securities law violations, when the securities laws' damage provisions have been
carefully restricted. See, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) ("It is simply incomprehensible that a plaintiff suing under the securities laws would receive
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II. SEDIMA, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX CO.
In Sedima, the Second Circuit imposed a new restriction on the right to
maintain a RICO civil action: private civil suits under RICO may be
pursued only after the defendant has been convicted of the predicate
criminal violations.60 The court in Sedima upheld a lower court's dismissal
of RICO charges brought by Sedima, S.P.R.L., a Belgian importer, against
Imrex Co., an American supplier of missile system parts. Sedima and Imrex
had entered into a joint venture to provide electronic component parts to a
NATO subcontractor in Belgium. Sedima charged that Imrex fraudulently
inflated prices, and shipping and financing charges, and that these acts
constituted a "pattern of racketeering." The district court dismissed the suit
for failure to allege a racketeering injury.
In affirming the dismissal, Judge Oakes, writing for the two-to-one
majority, said that recent uses of the civil RICO claim were "extraordinary,
if not outrageous. ",61 The court found there was "simply no evidence that in
creating RICO, Congress intended to create the broad civil cause of action
that the reading of the statute given by its proponents would allow." 62
Noting that the private civil remedy was added to RICO after most of the
legislative history was already written, the court concluded that "Congress
was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c)." 63 Further,
the court stated that Congress would at least have discussed its intent to
provide a federal forum for so many state law wrongs.
The Sedima court first affirmed a "racketeering injury" requirement,
citing earlier cases that had endorsed the requirement. 64 The court then
went beyond this requirement and held that, in addition, a prior criminal
conviction is a prerequisite to a civil RICO action. 65 In discussing the
necessity for a prior conviction, the court first reviewed other cases that had
rejected the requirement. Judge Oakes found the reasoning in these cases
one-third the damages of a plaintiff suing under RICO for the same injury."); see also Bridges, supra
note 43, at 45; Note, supra note 54, at 1522; Note, supra note 29, at 111-12. But see Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the
RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REv. 201, 205 (1981) (urging use of RICO as an alternative
remedy in securities fraud matters to offset the Supreme Court's restriction of the private cause of action
under traditional securities law).
60. Sedima, 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984).
61. Id. at 487.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 492.
64. Id. at 494. The Sedima court found it reasonable to assume that the similarities to the language
in the Clayton Act indicated Congress's desire to have an analogous standing limitation imposed in
RICO. While the court agreed that the antitrust competitive injury requirement should not be directly
imposed, it indicated that the RICO plaintiff must show "injury different in kind from that occurring as a
result of the predicate acts themselves,. . but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to
deter." Id. at 496.
65. Id. at 496.
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unpersuasive, noting that the district courts had rejected the requirement
with little analysis. 66 In determining that prior convictions are a prerequisite
for standing under civil RICO, the court relied on the fact that civil RICO
liability depends upon proving "indictable" or "chargeable" acts that are
criminal. 67 The court expressed particular concern that this criminal con-
duct would be established based only on a preponderance of the evidence in
civil RICO actions, rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.68 The
court held that, since the legislative history shows that Congress assumed a
preponderance standard was appropriate, "[t]he most logical conclusion to
be drawn is that Congress expected the criminality of the predicate acts to be
proved before the private action went forward-that a criminal conviction
must precede a private civil suit. ",69 Judge Cardamone in his dissent wrote a
point-by-point rebuttal of the majority's analysis. 70
III. ANALYSIS OF PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION
REQUIREMENT
By making prior criminal convictions a prerequisite, the Second Circuit
attempted to fashion a limitation that would control the breadth of RICO's
civil component. Prior to Sedima, few commentators or courts assessed the
need for a prior criminal conviction.71 Reaction to Sedima's holding has
been swift, with defense lawyers generally applauding the decision and
plaintiffs' lawyers denouncing it.72 Many predict confusion until the
66. Id. at 496-97. The Sedima majority noted that many of the cases rejected a prior criminal
conviction requirement based on the authority of United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), a case affirming the government's right to bring civil suits for
acts that are also punishable as crimes. The Sedima court stated that such reliance was misplaced, since
there are policy differences between government and private actions, and civil actions are unrestrained
by prosecutorial discretion. 741 F2d at 497. The dissent countered that to dismiss Cappetto because it
made no holding with respect to private civil actions puts the majority at odds with other Second Circuit
panels that have cited Cappetto with apparent approval in other respects. Id. at 504 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting).
67. 741 E2d at 499; see supra note 18 (discussing the underlying predicate acts).
68. 741 E2d at 501.
69. Id. at 502.
70. Id. at 504-08 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
71. For a listing of cases that reject a requirement of prior criminal convictions, see id. at 496-97.
Most commentators who urge courts to restrict the civil RICO cause of action propose other
limitations. See, e.g., Bridges, supra note 43, at 81 (recommending the imposition of guidelines for
applying RICO to securities violations), 46 (but commenting that "a plaintiff need not point to
convictions").
72. FlahertyA RICO Crisis, Nat'l L.J.L, Aug. 13,1984, at 1, col. 3 (reporting positive and negative
reactions of lawyers). A New York Times editorial, while sympathetic to the problem caused by the
expansive uses of RICO, opined that the "judges crossed a thin line between interpreting a law and
rewriting it to suit their concept of fairness." Using, andAbusing, the Rackets Law, N.Y. Times, Aug.
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Supreme Court addresses RICO's civil provisions.73
The prior criminal conviction requirement would provide definite guid-
ance to district courts in determining when a plaintiff can bring a civil
RICO action, 74 even though some questions in defining "conviction"
remain. 75 The requirement, however, receives little support from either the
21, 1984, at A-24, col. I.
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits addressed Sedima without analyzing the prior criminal conviction
requirement. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 393 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-822); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany
Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 n. 11 (8th Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit recently upheld the sufficiency
of a RICO claim apparently without requiring a prior criminal conviction. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v.
Swango, 743 F2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984). Some district courts outside the Second Circuit have rejected the
reasoning inSedima. See, e.g., Bennett v. E.H. Hutton Co., Inc., No. C83-1502A (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28,
1984) (prior conviction requirement is contrary to Sixth Circuit precedent in USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982)) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter, No. 82-1951-1 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library.
Dist file); Grado v. Gross, No. 84-1087-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984) (available on LEXIS. Genfed
library, Dist file); Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D.C. Kan. 1984) (calling
the prior criminal conviction requirement a "well-intended attempt" to slow the growing backlog of
civil RICO cases, but stating that the statute's language and legislative history "do not countenance such
limitations on civil RICO").
Other district courts have followed Sedima, thus dismissing civil RICO cases where no prior criminal
conviction was alleged. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel B.M., No. 84-2065 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 5, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,826, at 90,161-62 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1984) (adopting
Sedima's requirement for prior criminal conviction, but rejecting the racketeering injury requirement as
"too nebulous"); Gardner v. Surnamer, No. 82-2723 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 1984) (dismissing on both of
Sedima's grounds) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
73. Flaherty, supra note 72, at 1; Easton, Split Over RICO Provisions Widens, Legal Times, Oct.
29, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
74. Administrative ease has been suggested as a legitimate consideration when a search for
legislative meaning has been inconclusive. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 820 (1983).
75. Courts applying Sedima will need to decide, for example, whether pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere are sufficient to satisfy the prior criminal conviction requirement. In response to criminal
charges, a defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or nolo contendere. See, e.g., SECrION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION MANUAL 49 (1983). A guilty plea
is an admission that the charges and each of their elements are correct as alleged. In a nolo contendere
plea, the defendant admits his guilt for purposes of punishment, but does not necessarily admit to the
charges. Id. The Supreme Court has stated in another context that a guilty plea "is itself a conviction" of
the offense charged. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
A court also must decide when the statute of limitations begins to run. The RICO statute does not
contain a statute of limitations governing private civil actions. Courts have applied the statute of
limitations of the most closely analagous state claims. See, e.g., Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F.
Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983). However, federal law controls when the cause of action accrues;
generally this is when the plaintiff knew or should have known of alleged injuries underlying the
complaint. Id. at 427-28. If a court were to require a prior criminal conviction, the most plausible time
for accrual would probably be the date of conviction itself. See Creamer v. General Teamsters Local
Union 326,579 F Supp. 1284, 1291 (D. Del. 1984) (civil plaintiffs had knowledge of their RICO claim
upon availability of transcript from the prior criminal trial).
Another unresolved question is collateral estoppel. The statute only addresses collateral estoppel in
civil suits brought by the government. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982). Courts have nonetheless given
472
Civil RICO and the Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement
language of the statute or its legislative history. Further, it creates significant
barriers for many civil RICO plaintiffs for whom Congress intended to
provide a remedy The prior criminal conviction requirement also is con-
trary to the private attorney general concept which Congress incorporated
into the RICO statute. RICO's liberal construction clause76 reinforces the
view that Congress did not intend the civil provision of the statute to be
construed so narrowly.77
A. Statutory Analysis
In its two RICO cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a court must
look first to a statute's language to determine its scope. 78 Section 1964(c)
provides that "[any person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor . . . . 79
Inquiry into the scope of the cause of action must begin, then, with a
determination of the meaning of the phrase "violation of section. 1962" as
used in the statute. Section 1962 states that certain kinds of acts, when
accomplished through a pattern of racketeering activity, are unlawful.8 0
"Racketeering activity," in turn, is defined in section 1961 as meaning
certain predicate acts "chargeable under State law" or "indictable" under
certain federal statutes. 81
collateral estoppel effect to prior criminal convictions in RICO actions brought by private plaintiffs. See
Anderson v. Janovich, 543 R Supp. 1124, 1128-29 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Municipality of Anchorage v.
Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 644 (D. Alaska 1982); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F Supp. 673, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. Posner, supra note 74, at 818 n.61 (suggesting that judges should be alert to any sign of
legislative intent regarding the freedom for interpreting statutes, and citing RICO as an example of a
statute in which Congress indicated its intent for broad construction).
The Supreme Court relied, at least in part, on the liberal construction clause in both of its decisions
construing criminal RICO. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302 (1983); United States v.
Tbrkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981). In Russello, the Court construed the term "interest" in
§ 1963(a)(1), holding that the language of the statute plainly indicated that the term covered the
insurance proceeds petitioner received as a result of arson activities. 104 S. Ct. at 300. In Turkette, the
Court held that "enterprise" as it was used in RICO encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises. 452 U.S. at 593.
The Court has not yet addressed RICO's civil cause of action; both Russello and Turkette refer only to
the statutes criminal provisions. The civil cause of action, however, is based upon establishing that the
defendant committed acts prohibited by the Act's criminal provisions. Thus it creates a basic dependence
in the civil arena on the criminal provisions and the decisions construing those provisions.
78. Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (quoting Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 1962; supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
81. Id. § 1961; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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The term "violation" is not specifically defined in the RICO statute. In
cases of silence, courts usually assume that the legislature expressed itself
with words used according to their ordinary meaning. 82 The dictionary
defines "violation" as an act or instance of breaking a law or regulation. 83 A
person "violates" a law at the time he does what the law forbids, not when
he is convicted of doing so; the violation occurs even if the violator is never
caught. Thus, on its face the statute does not imply that only those parties
who have been injured by persons convicted of RICO violations can bring
actions. 84 Furthermore, Congress has used the word "violation" in other
statutes to apply in a civil as well as a criminal context.85
The same analysis applies to "indictable" and "chargeable." The suffix
"-able" means "capable of, fit for, or worthy of," or "susceptible of." 86
The statute should be read to give effect to Congress' choice of the
subjunctive. Thus, an individual who has committed chargeable or indicta-
ble acts need be merely susceptible to criminal prosecution to qualify as a
civil RICO defendant. A fair reading of the statute is that a defendant need
not have been already charged or indicted-much less convicted-for
those acts.
The Sedima court, in essence, rewrote the statute instead of interpreting
its language. The Sedima court imposed the prior criminal conviction
requirement in part because civil courts do not traditionally determine
which facts lead to "indictable" or "chargeable" acts. 87 This, it said, is the
proper function of grand juries and prosecutors, respectively What the
82. Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299.
83. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1430-31 (W. Morris ed.
1981) defines "violation" as "[t]he actofviolating or the condition of being violated" or "[a]n instance
of violation; a transgression; desecration; infraction." It defines the verb "violate" as "to break (a law or
regulation, for example) intentionally or unintentionally." Id. at 1430.
84. Judge Oakes argues in Sedima that the differences between the particular words in RICO and
those in the Clayton Act are instructive, and that the change was made with the intent in mind to require
prior conviction of the predicate acts. 741 F.2d at 498. The Clayton Act provision reads in relevant part
"by reason of anything forbidden," while § 1964(c) of RICO reads "by reason of a violation." As
Judge Oakes notes, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate why the House chose this
language over that in the Clayton Act. In view of the plain language of the statute, however, it seems
equally reasonable to assume Congress was "eschew[ing] surplusage," an interpretation rejected in
Sedima. Id.
85. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980) (a "violation"-the term used by
Congress-of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act leads to civil, not criminal liability); see also
Grado v. Gross, No. 84-1087-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) ("[A]s anyone whose parked car has overstayed its welcome on metered city streets can testify, the
word 'violation' has meaning in the civil as well as the criminal context.").
86. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 45 (F. Mish ed. 1983) defines the suffix
"-able" as meaning "capable of, fit for, or worthy of." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra
note 83, at 3, defines the suffix as "susceptible, capable, or worthy of."
87. Sedima, 741 E2d at 500.
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majority did was to rewrite the statute to read "indicted" under federal law
or "charged" under state law.88
The majority further rewrote "indictable" or "chargeable" to mean
"convicted." The Sedima court purported to look to the intent behind RICO
as a whole to conclude that the act was designed to combat conduct that had
already been found criminal. 89 The court reasoned that RICO liability does
not exist without criminal conduct,90 and the only way to prove criminal
conduct in a civil action is by proving a previous criminal conviction. This
reading ignores the fact that Congress chose the words, "indictable" and
"chargeable," and not "convicted." Congress' use of the word "convic-
tion" elsewhere in the statute91 supports a conclision, contrary to the
court's, that the absence of the word in section 1964(c) was deliberate.
It is not easy to dismiss, however, the court's concern that "inherently
criminal" conduct is determined under RICO only upon proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.92 If one assumes that "racketeering activity"
consists only of criminal conduct, 93 Judge Oakes may be correct in ques-
88. If the Second Circuit had stopped with "indicted" as its interpretation, it might have allowed
Sedima's action, since Imrex was reported to have been indicted by a grand jury for allegedly falsifying
financial documents. See Racketeering Act's Use in Civil Suits is Curbed Sharply, Wall St. J., July 27,
1984, § 1, at 8, col. 2 (indicating that the motion for dismissal of these charges was pending).
89. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500.
90. To support its finding that the conduct referred to is inherently criminal, the court in Sedima,
741 F.2d at 501, cited United States v. Campanale, 518 F2d 352, 365 n.36 (9th Cir. 1975) ("the acts
constituting racketeering activity must themselves be criminal offenses"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); Salisbury v. Chapman, 527 R Supp. 577, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("RICO does not contain any
substantive prohibitions unknown to other sections of federal criminal law. Instead, it confers upon
victims of certain criminal violations the right to proceed in a civil suit against the offenders.").
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982) provides that "[u]pon conviction of a person under this section,
the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited
under this section .... "Section 1964(d) provides that a previously convicted RICO defendant shall
be estopped from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent govern-
ment civil proceeding. Id. § 1964(d).
92. The Supreme Court in Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96
(1981) stated that when Congress has not indicated a specific standard of proof, the judiciary must
resolve the question by referring to the legislature's intent. The few cases that have addressed the burden
of proof issue in civil RICO actions have concluded that the preponderance standard is appropriate. See
Matz, Determining the Standard of Proof ln Lawsuits Brought Under RICO, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1983,
at 21, col. 1. Matz indicates that the burden of proof in civil RICO actions has been referred to in only
eight published cases, and none has carefully analyzed the issue. Id. at 25, col. 1. Many of the private
civil cases simply rely on the fact that government civil proceedings use the preponderance standard.
See, e.g., Pames v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 487 . Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Legislative history indicates that Congress chose the preponderance standard for government civil
actions over the objections of some witnesses who felt that the pattern of racketeering activity should be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. House Hearings, supra note 12, at 106-07, 664, 687. But see id. at
187 (opposing view advocating the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
93. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499. The definition of racketeering is discussed supra notes 47-54 and
accompanying text.
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tioning whether private plaintiffs should be able to establish this element
against the lowest burden of proof when each element in a criminal
prosecution must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, on its
face the statute does not prescribe a higher burden of proof any more than it
requires a criminal conviction. Furthermore, no court, including the Sedima
court, has held that section 1964 is unconstitutional because the plaintiff
bears a lower burden of proof.94 In the absence of congressional intent to the
contrary or an explicit finding of unconstitutionality, the least onerous
burden of proof is most likely the appropriate reading of the statute's
requirements. 95
94. Judge Cardamone explored the constitutionality of § 1964 absent criminal convictions. Sed-
ima. 741 E2d at 506 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). He reviewed the steps that the Supreme Court
established for cases in which civil remedies are challenged for being "quasi-criminal." Applying these
steps, he concluded that because the statute is "primarily remedial," § 1964(c) is constitutional. Id. at
507.
Early articles addressed similar concerns over the quasi-criminal aspects of the government's civil
remedies of forfeiture and divesture. See Note, Criminal Law-Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil
Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970), 53
TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1975) (cautioning restraint in use of divestiture because of quasi-punitive
nature); Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
"Criminal Activity, " 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 222 (1975) (concluding that the equitable remedies are
constitutional despite their criminal nature).
95. Matz, supra note 92, at 26, col. 4, concludes that the Supreme Court would probably apply the
preponderance standard. Nonetheless, Matz suggests that a more exacting standard such as clear and
convincing evidence may be more appropriate than the preponderance standard, at least for proving a
pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 21, col. I. The Supreme Court has imposed this standard as a
constitutional requirement in civil cases where quasi-criminal activity is alleged. See, e.g., Santosky v.
Kramer. 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (due process requires a clear and convincing standard in a
proceeding initiated by a state to terminate the rights of natural parents to retain custody over their
children); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (clear and convincing standard required in
proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a
state mental hospital). But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983)
(rejecting a clear and convincing standard or any standard more stringent than the preponderance test for
securities fraud damage actions, despite the fact that the civil action may be predicated upon fraud
constituting a criminal offense).
The Supreme Court has held that an elevated standard is appropriate where the individual interests at
stake are both "particularly important" and "more substantial than mere loss of money." Addington,
441 U. S. at 424. In civil RICO cases, the stigma of racketeering activity could well involve a significant
interest that exceeds the loss of money. Nonetheless there are practical reasons for maintaining a
preponderance standard. A clear and convincing standard may be unwieldy and potentially confusing
for juries, especially if applied to only one part of the cause of action, namely, proof of committing a
pattern of racketeering activity.
The dissent in Sedima noted that other civil actions have successfully applied a heightened standard
of proof. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 506 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 339-40 (2d ed. 1972) as listing cases in fraud, defamation, paternity and other
types of actions where courts have imposed a heightened burden). Thus the concerns of Sedima's
majority could be rectified without requiring prior criminal convictions. See infra note 135.
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In its RICO cases, the Supreme Court ruled that absent a clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, unambiguous statutory lan-
guage must be regarded as conclusive. 96 As Judge Oakes noted in Sedima,
RICO's civil provisions were enacted with little discussion. 97 From this
"clanging silence," Judge Oakes inferred that Congress did not intend a
broad application of RICO. He reasoned that if Congress had meant civil
RICO to apply so broadly, it would have said So.98 An equally plausible
interpretation, however, is that Congress simply did not intend the act's
scope to be limited. Indeed, there is some evidence to indicate that Con-
gress was aware that the statute did not require prior criminal convictions. 99
Nowhere does the legislative history indicate that Congress intended that a
RICO victim's ability to assert rights created by the statute should depend
upon the prosecutor's office.
B. Effect on Plaintiffs
The Sedima majority argued that the prior criminal conviction require-
ment should not create significant additional barriers for plaintiffs. 00 A
review of cases to date, however, supports the dissent's concern that the
requirement might exclude plaintiffs where the defendants' conduct
"would be near the heart of Congress' concer." 10 1 Precluding a RICO
claim might not deny all relief to a plaintiff, since the majority of civil
RICO cases also allege alternative federal or state claims; 102 nonetheless,
any congressional purpose in enacting the private civil RICO provisions
may well be thwarted.
The requirement of prior criminal convictions restricts the plaintiff's
cause of action to a narrow sphere. In reality, however, the circle of
wrongdoing from racketeering is probably far greater.' 0 3 The requirement
96. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296,299 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
97. Sedima, 741 E2d at 488-92.
98. Id. at 492.
99. Representative Mikva, at the time he offered an amendment to curtail frivolous suits under civil
RICO, stated that "there need not be a conviction under any of these laws for it to be racketeering." 116
CONG. REc. 35,342 (1970). See also Victims of Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 323,329 (1972) (Library of
Congress statement) (comparison of civil RICO with antitrust laws weighs heavily against interpreta-
tion that RICO requires prior convictions).
100. 741 E2d at 503.
101. Sedima, 741 E2d at 510 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Mauriber v. She arson/American
Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
102. See supra note 29 for statistics.
103. Few of the civil RICO cases in the recent "explosion" of activity, see supra note 23, have
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ignores the possibility that a prior civil judgment might establish criminal
behavior. 104 The requirement also ignores the fact that the cost of a criminal
trial, in terms of both time and money, forces prosecutors to choose cases
carefully 105 Not only might the government decide against prosecuting a
particular case, but an indictment might also fail to achieve a conviction, 1 06
followed government prosecutions. For cases following a prior criminal conviction, see Cullen v.
Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226 (2d. Cir. 1980): Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F Supp.
1284 (D. Del. 1984); County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Municipality of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982); Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F.
Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1982); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Private civil RICO actions have also followed a criminal indictment. See, e.g., International Business
Machines v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. C-82-4976 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 16, 1982), an unreported civil RICO
case discussed in Miller & Olson, supra note 4, at 74-75, in which IBM filed a civil RICO action after
the FBI organized a sting operation that led to the criminal indictment of Hitachi for alleged possession
of IBM trade secrets.
104. See, e.g., Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1984)
(held that testimony during a civil trial clearly showed violations of a state anti-bribery statute, thus
constituting the predicate offenses needed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity for a RICO
claim).
In one of the few articles to discuss limiting civil RICO suits by requiring prior government action.
one author suggests that a prior civil proceeding might adequately establish standing. Note, Civil Rico:
The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1119 (1982) (Congress
might curb the statute by requiring a "prior determination of liability in a government criminal or civil
proceeding").
105. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 228 n.28 (1983) ("Public enforcers have very
different incentive structures from private enforcers, with the result that they may tend to concentrate on
those cases likely to generate greater publicity and political visibility.").
The decision not to prosecute, which is inherent in the criminaljustice system, can be illustrated by
reviewing the process by which alleged securities violations are pursued. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has broad subpoena powers which it delegates to staff members investigating
suspected violations of the federal securities laws. After review at various levels, any one of which may
result in dropping the prosecution, the SEC refers the matter to the Department of Justice with a
recommendation that certain persons be indicted and prosecuted. If the Justice Department concurs in
the recommendation, the matter will be brought before a grand jury and, assuming indictment,
prosecuted by the United States Attorney. See, e.g., H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW §§ 1.15[l], 3.19[l], 8.01 (1984) (discussing SEC enforcement procedures). With so
many levels at which the prosecution may be dropped, it is not surprising that only the most egregious
securities law violations result in criminal convictions.
This is not to say that the criminal sanctions for securities violations are not effectively employed. One
author reports that between 1970 and 1980, the SEC referred more than 650 cases to the Justice
Department for possible criminal prosecution. During that decade, the Justice Department obtained
nearly 400 indictments that named 1400 defendants and resulted in nearly 1000 convictions. Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW 129, 149 (1984). The
breadth of the criminal provisions of the major federal securities laws is unparalleled in other federal
regulatory statutes. Id. at 147. Almost every major federal securities act includes a provision that makes
it a potential felony if the actor has willfully and/or knowingly violated any provision of the act, or any
rule or regulation thereunder. Id. at 147-49 (citing relevant securities laws).
106. For example, of the 434 criminal antitrust cases brought by the Justice Department between
1975 and 1983, defendants were found guilty at trial in only 42 of the cases. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATtON, supra note 75, at App. E.
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or the prosecutor might accept a plea bargain. 107
The criminal conviction requirement could also result in turning the
treble damage provision into "little more than a mirage"1 08 when read in
connection with RICO's forfeiture provision. 109 Under this provision, the
Attorney General may seize all interests that the convicted violator has
acquired or maintained as a result of racketeering. 110 A subsequent civil
litigant might find RICO violators judgment-proof. Yet the prior criminal
conviction requirement would prevent the litigant from bringing a claim
against any solvent but unconvicted defendants.I'
C. Impact on the Private Attorney General Concept
In searching for the meaning of a statute, courts must consider the
purposes it was meant to serve and the problems it was meant to remedy. 112
107. For civil RICO, plea bargaining would probably have its greatest effect in state criminal
actions or federal actions other than criminal RICO. Because a criminal RICO charge is usually a major
count of the indictment, the United States Attorney would not be likely to plea bargain away this count.
See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 42.
108. Grado v. Gross, No. 84-1087-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Dist file). The Grado court notes that the Second Circuit in Sedima did not touch upon the
relationship of§ 1964(c) to forfeitures. The court doubted that RICO's drafters intended that plaintiffs in
this situation should be denied recovery. Id.
109. The effect of forfeiture is illustrated in Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326,560 F.
Supp. 495 (1983), 579 F. Supp. 1284 (D.Del. 1984), a civil RICO case following a criminal conviction.
In Creamer, employees sued a union local and two co-employers, Universal Coordinators, Inc. (UCI)
and Inland Container Corporation. The employees claimed that the union breached its duty of fair
representation and the employers breached their collective bargaining contract when the employers
bribed the union to ignore violations of that contract in firing union employees to hire non-union people.
The union president and principals of defendant UCI were earlier convicted of racketeering offenses.
Between the first published civil decision in March 1983 and a second decision in January 1984, the
assets of defendant UCI were forfeited to the government, forcing the elimination of UCI as a defendant
in the civil action.
110. RICO's broad forfeiture provision provides that "[u]pon conviction of a person under
[§ 1963] the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property declared forfeited under
[that section]." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982). The property declared forfeited under § 1963 includes
"any interest [the violator] has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962." Id.
111. As in Creamer, civil suits following prior criminal convictions are often brought against
defendants different from those in the criminal case. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F2d 226 (2d
Cir. 1980) (city and county employees brought a class action against Nassau County, the Town of
Hempstead, the Republican Committees of the county and town, and various county and Republican
party officials, alleging that the defendants routinely extorted political contributions to the Republican
Party as a condition of plaintiffs' employment and promotion in civil service jobs; only defendant
Mzrgiotta was earlier convicted of federal offenses related to these events).
One can only surmise that the plaintiffs' choice of defendants relates to their perceived chances of
recovering damages. It may be that the criminally convicted defendant is not always the most
advantageous defendant in a civil action from a plaintiff's point of view. A requirement of prior
convictions could increase plaintiffs' agitation for prosecution of the deep-pocket defendants. Similarly,
defendants would be anxious for pleas or reduced charges to avoid subsequent civil suits. These civil
considerations seem inappropriate in the criminal process.
112. See, e.g., 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.06 (4th ed.
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One suggested approach is that judges should first imagine themselves in
the place of the enacting legislator by looking at the values and attitudes of
the period in which the legislation was enacted. 113 Prior to passage of the
Organized Crime Control Act in 1970, concern over the problem of
organized crime had been building for two decades. 114 The infiltration of
business by organized crime was well documented by 1967 when the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice recommended civil remedies to help control this problem.115 The
government's quest for effective measures to attack organized crime's
economic base culminated in the passage of RICO.
The majority in Sedima dismissed as irrelevant the early legislative
debate surrounding RICO's civil remedies, since section 1964(c)-the
private civil remedy-was added after this debate.116 Nonetheless, this
earlier debate provides an additional clue to the legislature's purpose in
adding a private cause of action. Organized crime was considered durable,
in part because of its high resistance to traditional methods of crime
control."l 7 As the Supreme Court has observed, the legislative history
clearly demonstrates that the RICO statute was intended to provide new
weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and
its economic roots. 118
As one of these "new" remedies, section 1964(c) was modeled after the
private enforcement provision of the antitrust laws. 119 Congress was aware
that giving treble damages to private antitrust plaintiffs serves not only to
provide private relief, but also serves the "high purpose of enforcing the
antitrust laws."120 Therefore, it seems likely that Congress, by adding a
1984) ("It is ancient wisdom that statutes should be interpreted so that the manifested purpose or object
can be accomplished.").
113. Posner, supra note 74, at 818.
114. As early as 1950 the problem of criminal infiltration of legitimate business was documented.
See S. Rep. No. 2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1950).
115. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 187 (1967). In Chapter 13, "A National Strategy," the
Commission advocated a coordinated effort against organized crime, to include a coalition of federal
and private resources working together. Id. at 279-91. While the Commission did not address use of
private suits, its recommendations for noncriminal controls included use of existing regulatory authority
against businesses controlled by organized crime, and encouraging private business groups to prevent
and uncover criminal business tactics. Id. at 208.
116. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 489.
117. For example, the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act's Finding No. 5 stated that organized
crime continued to grow because of defects in the law's evidence-gathering process and because the
present government sanctions and remedies were limited in scope and impact. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922, 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
118. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302 (1983).
119. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
120. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). See also
Fortner Enters. Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) ("Congress has encouraged
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private, treble-damage RICO remedy, meant to incorporate what has been
called the "most noteworthy feature" of the antitrust private remedies: the
"private attorney general" concept. 121
Private attorneys general serve to vindicate a "public interest" 122 by
supplementing public efforts to detect violators and bringing actions that
otherwise might not be initiated. 123 The private attorney general concept
has become a favorite tool of Congress for improving the effectiveness of its
laws. In addition to the antitrust area, Congress has relied on private
attorneys general to enforce environmental and securities laws and other
statutory policies. 124
Sedima's prior criminal conviction requirement nullifies the attorney
general concept in civil RICO. By following only in the wake of a govern-
ment conviction, the civil RICO plaintiff no longer serves to broaden the
scope of law enforcement. 125 Piggybacking onto government action places
private antitrust litigation not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but also to
vindicate the important public interest in free competition"); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
121. Grado v. Gross, No. 84-1087-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) ("it seems unlikely that Congress did not intend to incorporate what is probably the
most noteworthy feature of the antitrust law's system of private remedies: the fact that private parties are
authorized to act as private attorney generals [sic], and are not required to wait until the 'public' attorney
general has acted.").
Others have also concluded that RICO includes a private attorney general concept. See, e.g., Wilcox
v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F Supp. 561, 567 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("RICO casts civil litigants in the role of
private attorneys general in combating organized crime"); Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some
Maturational Problems and Proposals for Reform, 35 RrrERs L. Rv. 285, 324-25 (1983) (a civil
RICO plaintiff is as much a private attorney general as an antitrust plaintiff).
122. The term "private attorney general" dates from 1943 when Judge Jerome Frank first used it to
describe private persons authorized to bring suits "to vindicate the public interest." Associated Indus.,
Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); see Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,262 (1972) (by offering potential antitrust litigants the prospect of a
treble recovery, "Congress encouraged these persons to serve as 'private attorneys general').
123. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (discussing securities law); see also
Coffee, supra note 105. Coffee observed that private litigation is potentially more efficient, since the
private attorney general can react more quickly than the public enforcer. Private litigation also helps
ensure the stability of legal norms; in performing a failsafe function, it helps prevent federal laws from
being underenforced due to budgetary cutbacks or changes in political philosophy Id. at 226-27.
Coffee characterized private suits following government actions as "free-riding," id. at 223-24, and
criticized these as an improper use of the private attorney general concept. Id. at 226.
124. Coffee, supra note 105, at 216 n.3 (listing major federal statutes that authorize an award of
attorneys' fees to finance private attorneys general).
One district court claimed that "the general public interest in the enforcement of RICO is at least as
great as the public interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws." S.A. Mineracao DaTrindade-Samitri v.
Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F Supp. 566, 575 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 745 F2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
125. Nonetheless, private treble damages in a civil action following criminal convictions do serve
to intensify the penalty. Senator Hruska noted that RICO offers an "extraordinary potential for striking a
mortal blow against the property interests of organized crime." 116 CONG. Rnc. 602 (1970); see also
House Hearings, supra note 12, at 544 (statement of Edward L. Wright, ABA president-elect) (noting
that some legislative proposals to combat organized crime recognized that "money is the key to power in
the underworld").
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private litigation where it may be needed least-subsequent to the vio-
lator's detection and conviction. By reducing the effectiveness of the private
attorney general concept; the prior criminal conviction requirement
directly contradicts the enacting legislature's desire to fashion "new
remedies in order to achieve its far-reaching objectives." 126
IV. THE SEARCH FOR REASONED LIMITS TO RICO
The judiciary's various attempts to limit civil RICO suits suggest that the
private attorney general concept is not operating effectively in the battle to
combat organized crime. The limitations reflect judicial discomfort with
rising caseloads 127 and concern that suits are being brought that are far
removed from what Congress intended. Even those who oppose judicial
restrictions on civil RICO agree that Congress may not have foreseen the
broad application of the statute. 128
Yet legislatures generally draft statutes without a full appreciation of the
potential problems in their application. 129 Courts must decide the precise
effect of these statutes in specific fact situations, applying limitations
whenever necessary to fulfill the enacting legislature's purposes. 130 The
126. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302 (1983).
127. See supra note 23 for statistics. However, Professor Blakey, one of the drafters of the statute,
denies there is any overload of RICO cases. Flaherty, supra note 72, at 30.
128. For example, the Seventh Circuit rejected other courts' limitations of the statute, stating that
Congress "chose to employ that extraordinarily broad language in order to achieve its desired goals."
Haroco, Inc., v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53
U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-822). Nonetheless, with respect to the bank fraud case
before it, the court commented that "it does not seem at all likely that Congress anticipated the
application of civil RICO to improperly calculated interest charges by a commercial bank." Id. at 399.
129. See Posner, supra note 74, at 801, who noted that most canons of construction inaccurately
impute an omniscience to Congress that is unrealistic. Ambiguities in interpreting statutes may result,
not necessarily from poor drafting, but from the fact that the legislative process necessarily precedes
determination in specific situations.
130. Underlying much of the controversy over civil RICO is the propriety of judicial restrictions,
rather than leaving further statutory limitations to Congress. For commentaries urging that it is proper
for courts to apply limits to RICO suits, see, e.g., Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An
Analysis of RICO. 65 IowA L. REV. 837, 892 (1980) (referring primarily to criminal RICO); Bridges,
supra note 43, at 79; Tarlow, supra note 42, at 424.
For commentaries advocating that RICO can only be restricted by Congress, see Blakey & Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1031 (1980); Blakey, supra note 12, at 348-49; Wexler, supra note
121, at 287-88; Comment, supra note 46, at 71; Note, supra note 104, at 1119. Blakey, in particular, has
been widely cited for proposing a broad reading of the statute.
In antitrust litigation, courts have recognized that Congress's intent to have potential litigants serve as
private attorneys general does not mean that "the antitrust laws [should] provide a remedy in damages
for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972); see also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977) (Court
denied standing under antitrust to indirect purchasers).
Recent Supreme Court actions have also narrowed the availability of an implied private cause of action
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challenge in interpreting civil RICO is to achieve a construction that rests
upon the language of the statute, while providing a measure of prosecutorial
restraint similar to that which operates in public enforcement.131 If civil
RICO is to serve the "public interest" that Congress envisioned, private
enforcement efforts need to be directed to those cases that the public
enforcement agency would choose to prosecute if it had sufficient
resources. Only then will RICO's treble damages incentives properly be
enlisted to aid in deterring racketeering.
As discussed above,132 the prior criminal conviction requirement does
not accomplish the legislative objective of the private attorney general
concept. Courts should look for other limitations that would prove less
damaging to the private attorney general concept, yet would provide the
necessary direction for bringing private actions. The most successful limita-
tion to date is the racketeering injury requirement. 133
The Sedima court adopted the racketeering injury requirement as its
alternative holding. It observed that the requirement, which other courts
have endorsed, derives support from RICO's statutory language as well as
from RICO's bond with the Clayton Act.' 34 The court argued that the
requirement is consistent with the enacting legislature's intent that RICO
provide additional remedies to fight organized crime, not merely provide
remedies for already compensable injuries.
In a decision issued the day after the Sedima opinion, the Second Circuit
in Bankers Trust v. Rhoades Co. 135 continued to read RICO narrowly by
for securities fraud. The Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), signalled the end of the era of expansive construction of Rule lOb-5 adopted by lower federal
courts. This narrowing has been continued in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (with
regard to scienter); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (with regard to deception);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (with regard to duty to disclose); and Dirks v. SEC, 103
S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (further limits on disclosure duty).
131. See supra note 42.
132. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 47-54, and accompanying text for discussion of racketeering injury. Con-
versely, the limitation of ties to organized crime, see supra note 46, has been too thoroughly discredited
to offer potential for limiting civil RICO suits.
An alternative approach is to impose a heightened burden of proof. See discussion supra note 95; see
also Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 4, at 717-18 (heightened standard offers the only
principled means of limiting civil RICO; clear and convincing standard would be "consistent with both
RICO's legislative history and the traditional judicial power to determine the burden of proof').
Knowledge of the stricter burden might deter a number of the less appropriate suits now being brought.
This alternative, however, does not explicitly provide direction to courts for narrowing suits to those
detecting and enforcing a particular type of activity. Civil RICO actions might still be initiated that
extend the statute's application beyond the scope of conduct targeted by the enacting legislature.
134. Sedima, 741 E2d at 494.
135. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), petitionfor cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984)
(No. 84-657).
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again requiring that a plaintiff allege a racketeering injury. 136 In light of its
conclusion, the Bankers Trust panel indicated it need not reach Sedima's
alternative ground of requiring a prior criminal conviction. 137 The court's
conclusion perhaps indicates a preference for the racketeering injury
requirement. The court proposed examples of injuries that would satisfy the
requirement, 138 in an apparent attempt to counter criticism that the require-
ment is ill-defined. 139
Commentators who advocate the racketeering injury requirement reason
that it helps to direct attention to the factor that distinguishes organized
crime from regular crime-the extra wrong of organization itself. 140 Under
the racketeering injury analysis, RICO's proper target is thus not the
individual crimes listed in section 1961, but rather the threat of violations
of section 1962, that is, the investment, acquisition, maintenance of control
or participation in an enterprise. Such threats exist apart from those posed
by the particular acts of racketeering. These commentators therefore urge
judges to carefully scrutinize RICO claims for an enterprise (section 1962)
injury. 141
Some courts fear, however, that the requirement unduly restricts the
private plaintiffs' cause of action. 142 For example, in what is probably the
most comprehensive review to date of the racketeering injury requirement,
the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust
136. The Bankers Trust panel described this as a "but-for" test, where each element of the violation
must be a cause of the injury. Id. at 517. But see Furman v. Cirrito, 741 E2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984)
(criticizing the requirement of a racketeering enterprise injury imposed by Sedima and Bankers Trust).
137. 741 F.2d at 516 n.5.
138. Id. at 517. For example, if a person is denied fire insurance because of multiple arson acts
caused by an enterprise, and the person's property subsequently suffers innocent fire damage, his
monetary loss would be the result of the pattern of predicate acts of the enterprise. Or, a plaintiff might
be forced to incur an unwanted business partner because the enterprise has jeopardized his business by
feloniously causing customers to withhold their custom. In these instances, "the plaintiff would have
suffered an injury to his business or property by reason of the defendants' use of a RICO enterprise and a
pattern of racketeering acts." Id.
139. Other courts have noted the difficulty in interpreting and applying the racketeering injury
requirement. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir.
1984) (calling it "a slippery concept whose definition has eluded even those courts professing to
recognize it"); In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (courts requiring it "have not
defined the parameters of this concept and it borders on impossible to apply that which defies
definition"); see also Note, supra note 31, at 110 (calling the examples given by courts and commen-
tators "tenuous").
140. See Bridges, supra note 43, at 70.
141. Id. at 71 ("Courts should have no difficulty in requiring a distinct section 1962 injury rather
than turning to section 1961(1) to find grounds for section 1964(c) damages.").
142. See, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-822) (this restriction "reduces
RICO's civil provisions to a trivial remedy, available in only a tiny fraction of RICO violations and
dependent upon entirely fortuitous facts").
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Co.143 observed that Sedima's racketeering injury requirement appears to
revive the discredited organized crime nexus, 144 and also blends elements
of competitive injury and indirect injury, concepts that the Seventh Circuit
rejected in earlier decisions. 145 In refusing to adopt a racketeering injury
requirement, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the statute was deliberately
and extraordinarily broad, indicating Congress's desire for breadth over
precision. 146
Critics of the racketeering injury requirement also argue that reliance on
the antitrust analogy is inappropriate in view of the different purposes of the
antitrust and racketeering laws. 147 Antitrust, they argue, is a preservative
statute. The policy of restricting the recovery of private antitrust plaintiffs
prevents eliminating defendants from the marketplace, reducing competi-
tion, and thus defeating the very objectives of the statute itself. In contrast,
RICO is described as a purgative statute. Its function is not to promote
market efficiency, but to ruin racketeers economically-to purge society of
organized crime groups by depriving them of their assets. 148 Thus, these
critics argue, it is improper to impose antitrust cause of action limitations in
the civil RICO context.
The controversy over the correct interpretation of civil RICO's cause of
action invites legislative resolution. 149 Nonetheless, the racketeering injury
requirement appears to offer more promise for fulfilling congressional
143. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14,1985) (No.
84-822).
144. Id. at 394 (referring to the Sedimna court's use of the term "mobsters" and its repeated
references to organized criminal groups). The Sedima Respondent rebuts this implication, since the
Sedima court only used the term "mobster" once. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 E2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648).
145. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 395 (referring to the Sedina court's use of the phrase "systemic harm to
competition and the market," and the implication of limiting recovery to indirect victims).
The Bankers Trust examples, supra note 138, could indeed be viewed as allowing a RICO cause of
action only for indirect injuries. This indirect injury requirement was criticized by the Seventh Circuit in
Haroco, 747 E2d at 397-98, as well as by the Bankers Trust dissent, 741 F.2d at 522 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting). The Sedima Respondent in its brief to the Supreme Court, however, suggested that "the
direct/indirect analysis is erroneous, and undermines a proper analysis of Civil RICO." Brief for
Respondent, supra note 144, at 6-7.
146. Haroco, 747 E2d at 398-99.
147. See, e.g., Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 4, at 694-95; Note, supra note 104, at
1113.
148. See supra note 125.
149. Congress should seriously question whether the civil cause of action is an effective tool for
controlling organized crime. See Comment, supra note 31, at 497 (concluding that Congress should
abolish § 1964(c)); Note, supra note 104, at 1119.
The American Bar Association has endorsed a series of recommended congressional changes that
would restrict the statute's use in criminal and civil actions. See ABA REPorr, supra note 43.
485
Washington Law Review
intent than the prior criminal conviction requirement. Adopting the rack-
eteering injury requirement would allow lower courts to develop a body of
case law that would move from an intuitive response 150 to a more reasoned
analysis. 151 While the statute and its history do not compel courts to apply a
racketeering injury requirement, the "by reason of" language and support-
ing antitrust analogy provide a firmer toehold for limiting the statute than
that provided by the prior criminal conviction requirement. 152 Furthermore,
the racketeering injury requirement does not prove as damaging to the
private attorney general concept. By redirecting suits to focus on enterprise
violations and not just individual crimes, this requirement for "something
more" may most closely approximate the public's interest in combatting
organized crime. 153
V. CONCLUSION
"To cast a net sufficiently wide to catch organized criminals, Congress
took the calculated risk that others, whose activities are chargeable as
crimes under other federal or state laws, would also be netted."' 154 The
Second Circuit's prior criminal conviction requirement establishes a cause
of action so narrow that it risks netting no one. Thus it denies relief where it
might be appropriate. In practice, the prior criminal conviction requirement
succeeds too well as a restriction of private suits-far surpassing perhaps
even the Second Circuit's desire to curb civil RICO suits.
By incorporating a private attorney general concept in RICO, Congress
sought to achieve the promise of private enforcement supplementing public
efforts against organized crime. With unfettered application of the broadly-
drafted civil RICO provisions, this promise remains unfulfilled. Courts, in
redirecting the private attorney general concept to more closely adhere to
150. The court in Catenella observed that "many courts appear to treat RICO in general and the
racketeer enterprise injury in particular, with the same analysis employed in the obscenity area-they
know it when they see it!" 583 F Supp. at 1437 n.9. The court cited two courts that used this in order to
explain their view of RICO, Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Finance Co., 577 F Supp. 1415,
1430 (D. Ore. 1984); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F Supp. 1466, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
151. In the context of criminal RICO, one author hypothesized that if lower courts do not impose
limitations themselves, "the end result may be that the Supreme Court will strike down major portions
of RICO as unconstitutional, thus thwarting the operation of the statute entirely" Bradley, supra note
130, at 892-93.
152. Courts have observed that since the virtual identity of relevant language between civil RICO
and antitrust is neither accidental nor meaningless, the analogy offers "the most logical point of
departure in fashioning a well-reasoned construction of § 1964(c)." Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l,
Inc., 545 F Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
153. Matz, supra note 92, at 25, col. I (to emphasize the difference between the effects of predicate
crimes and the elements of a RICO cause of action undermines the argument "that a civil RICO
proceeding is tantamount to a criminal prosecution"); see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
154. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 510 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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the legislature's purpose, should seek alternatives to the prior criminal
conviction requirement.
Diana K. Carey
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